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Australia has never had a large public social service system like those
of the Nordic countries, or even of the United Kingdom. Instead, most
social services have been delivered by a range of organisations that has
included, but not been dominated by, the public sector. However, the
mixed economy of Australian welfare services has not been static. In
recent decades, both the organisational mix and the modes of coordina-
tion have changed significantly. Successive governments have expanded
publicly funded social provision without expanding the public sector,
by directly subsidising private provision, by contracting private agen-
cies to deliver services, and by subsidising consumer purchases from
approved private providers using tax expenditures and voucher-like
instruments. Policies have been rolled out at different rates and with
different instruments across the range of areas of Australian social pol-
icy. Yet the direction of change overall is clear – market organisations
and market logics are playing an increasing role.
One consequence is that the profile of social service providers has
changed. Although non-profit organisations continue to have a leading
role in provision, for-profit, often corporate, organisations have grown
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considerably and have become an influential constituency in the social
policy process. For-profit provision now dominates long day care for
children and some forms of residential care for older people, and has a
growing presence in other fields, including job placement services and
community care. Meanwhile, public sector provision has stagnated, de-
clined or disappeared altogether, depending on the field (see Table 1).
In addition to changing ‘provider’ arrangements, there has been
an evolving role for the ‘consumer’ in social service systems, as the
trend towards ‘individualisation’ or ‘personalisation’ of social provision
has gathered strength. It has been argued that a new ‘hybrid’ subject
of social policy has been created: the ‘citizen-consumer’, or the ‘citizen
as consumer of public services who expects to exercise choice in the
provision of public services, just as s/he exercises choice in “consumer
society” ’ (Clarke et al. 2007, p. 1). This dimension of marketisation has
altered relationships between citizens and the state, and between citi-
zens and the organisations and professionals that they interact with in
social service systems.
The state may not be the dominant actor in social policy provision
in Australia, but it remains the dominant funder of human and social
services. Thus, private organisations receive billions in public funds to
deliver social services to citizens or to provide for social needs. The re-
sult is a service system with complex combinations of individual and
collective financing, private and public provision, and public, market
and associational rationalities. This raises important questions about
how financial flows from the public to the private sector, within the
private sector, and to and from citizens, are organised and monitored.
Given that the key purposes of social policy are to reduce inequality and
poverty (Goodin et al. 1999, pp. 26–27; Korpi & Palme 1998, p. 661), it
remains necessary to trace ‘who benefits?’ from Australian social pol-
icy (Bryson 1992; Marston & McDonald 2013), even in the context
of this complexity. Beyond questions about the distribution and redis-
tribution of resources, marketisation in Australian social policy also
raises questions about the distribution of social advantage and disad-
vantage (that is, ‘who suffers?’), and about the democratic steering of
social policy (that is, ‘who decides?’). This book aims to capture some of
the complexity of marketisation in Australian social policy, and thereby
contribute some answers to these questions.
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Marketisation: a multifaceted lens
Looking at Australian social policy through the lens of marketisation
involves marking out and marking off territory for analysis. A threshold
decision is the choice of term – privatisation is an alternative, and has
been broadly defined and used in ways which make it more or less
synonymous with marketisation.1 However, despite its encompassing
meaning-in-use, the word privatisation suggests a one-way movement
from public to private, while marketisation suggests a more compre-
hensive process that takes in the importation of characteristically pri-
vate sector ways of doing things into the public sector. In fact, contrib-
utors to this volume use both terms, and we have not enforced a single
definition.
Marking out our analytical territory is a complex endeavour, for
a range of reasons. One is that the concept of marketisation is itself
somewhat protean. This is partly because the concept attempts to cap-
ture sweeping social transformations, and so is very abstract, and partly
because the concept has been framed and mobilised in diverse ways
across the social sciences, in which each discipline has its characteristic
starting points, objects, methods and questions. Even if there is some
agreement that marketisation is about ideologies, politics and policies,
how these are related is much more contested. Another challenge is that
any attempt at synoptic analysis of this complex process confronts the
divergent trajectories of change across time and policy domains: mar-
ket reforms have been introduced at different times and have unfolded
at different rates in different policy domains, so that the nature and pace
of change varies between them. This means that general statements
about the ‘extent’ of marketisation overall are difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to make. Yet another is that if we focus on market-making policies,
we find a range of different instruments and rationales that do not form
a cohesive whole. Enhancing consumer choice, for example, does not
always result in efficiencies and cost-savings, the other common goals
of marketising reform. In other words, in practice, marketisation is not
one thing. Nor is marketisation a project solely of right-wing parties
and governments – both right and left have undertaken marketising re-
1 ‘Liberalisation’ is yet another widely used term, which to us seems even more
encompassing, not to say diffuse.
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forms, although they tend to use different rationales and instruments
consistent with the divergence in their natural constituencies (Gingrich
2011; Zehavi 2012). Related, some forms of marketisation appear to en-
hance rights, while others seem to reduce them. Actually, rather than
some measures being rights-enhancing and others rights-reducing, it is
more likely that different measures create different arrays of gains and
losses, and of winners and losers in an uneven mosaic. The diversity of
effects is also complicated by the subjective corollaries of marketisation;
positioning people as customers instead of citizens or clients or patients
not only changes their relationships with service organisations and pro-
fessionals, but also their experiences and assessments of social services.
In short, the diversity of practices, rationales, trajectories, actors
and impacts makes it difficult to establish marketisation definitively as a
phenomenon which can be tied to a specific set of principles, strategies
and effects that apply uniformly across the field of Australian social pol-
icy. Nevertheless, we – researchers and citizens alike – apprehend that
profound shifts have occurred and are occurring. Thus, complexities
notwithstanding, the contributions to the book document the various
elements in their current form, and hold them both still and together to
reflect on them as though they are a phenomenon.
So how have we marked our analytical territory? In relation to mar-
ketisation, we include any and all of those processes through which
policymakers shift ownership, provision, financing, and/or regulation
of an asset or activity from the public to the private (for-profit or
non-profit) sector (Aulich & O’Flynn 2007). We also include those
processes through which rationalities and practices from the private
sector are brought into the internal operation of public sector organi-
sations themselves. Often called the ‘new public management’ (NPM),
these processes have sought to introduce ‘market discipline’ into how
public sector organisations run themselves, and into their modes of
coordinating their relationships with the external organisations they
increasingly fund and regulate to provide services (Diefenbach 2009;
Pierre 1995).2 Marketising measures include output-based funding,
2 Note that Aulich and O’Flynn (2007) call these processes ‘privatisation’;
Diefenbach (2009) uses the term ‘New Public Management’, and Pierre (1995) uses
the term ‘marketisation’.
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contracting out, competitive tendering, asset sales, voucher systems,
public–private partnerships and user pays.3
But a list of measures does not quite communicate the character
of marketising change, which, as noted above, has altered the profile of
organisations that provide social services, and the ways they relate to
each other, to the state and to service users. Developments such as the
growth of a for-profit private sector and the use of competition to or-
ganise social markets are changing the array of institutional logics that
are organising the field of social policy in Australia. Here we take in-
sights from the sociology of institutions, which theorises society as ‘an
inter-institutional system of societal sectors in which each sector repre-
sents a different set of expectations for social relations and human and
organizational behavior’ (Thornton & Ocasio 2008, p. 104). Thornton
and colleagues (2012, p. 73) identify the following ‘institutional orders’
or ‘sectors’: family, community, religion, state, market, profession and
corporation. In ideal type, each sector has distinctive sources of legit-
imacy and authority and a distinctive basis of norms (among other
elements). Although all sectors are relevant, to some degree, in the field
of social services, community, state and market are most important for
this book. According to Thornton and colleagues (2012, p. 73), the in-
stitutional logic of the community – what we also call an associational
logic in the book – has trust and reciprocity as its sources of legitimacy,
commitment to community values as its source of authority and group
membership as the basis of its norms. The institutional logic of the state
has democratic participation as its source of legitimacy, bureaucratic
domination as its source of authority, and citizenship as the basis of its
norms. In the market sector, the source of legitimacy is share price, the
source of authority is shareholder activism and the source of norms is
self-interest. Importantly, given our focus on marketisation, competi-
tion as a strategy is also a defining feature of a market logic (Thornton
et al. 2012, p. 100).
These ideas offer further means of capturing marketisation: it is a
process through which the institutional logic of the market is crowding
out the associational logic within (and carried by) non-profit organisa-
3 Not all are considered in detail in the book. See Whitfield (2006) for a
comprehensive typology and Mudge (2008) for an analysis situating these
developments under the umbrella of neoliberalism.
Introduction: Capturing marketisation in Australian social policy
5
tions and the bureaucratic and democratic logics within (and carried
by) the state. According to some organisational theorists and policy
analysts, public and private organisations are becoming less distinc-
tive as they ‘hybridise’ in mixed economies undergoing market reforms
(Clarke 2004; Evers 2005; but see also Andersen & Sand 2011). It is
true that ‘structural overlap’ (Thornton & Ocasio 2008, p. 116) between
public and private organisations is increasing, as they are forced into
association by marketising reform, and that we would expect their new
relationships to change the institutional logics guiding both. However,
it does not seem true that ‘publicness’ no longer has meaning, or that
private corporations and non-profit organisations have (iso)morphed
into copies of one another. Thus, the categories of public, for-profit and
non-profit are critical in organising analysis in the book, even as their
limitations are explored and discussed.
Since the book is about social policy, we also comment briefly on
how we have marked out this terrain, and point out that contributors
have addressed more traditional and less traditional policy domains.
Most deal with social services rather than income support, because in-
come support policies for people of working age have been transformed
by related rationales but with quite different measures to those that
are the primary focus here. The volume includes studies of community
aged care, housing, superannuation and health care but also of school-
ing, banking and immigration skills assessment. Further, the way con-
tributors have engaged marketisation in Australian social policy is nec-
essarily historical, contextual and empirical. In that sense, the book
extends earlier work by Australian researchers (Carney & Ramia 2002;
Considine 2001; Healy 1998; King & Meagher 2009; Muetzelfeldt &
Briskman 2003; Pusey 1991; Rees et al. 1993; Smyth & Cass 1998)4 and
joins several more recent international volumes that have grappled with
market-making and the relationship between public and private in all
their diverse expressions in the social policy sphere (see, for example,
Ascoli & Ranci 2002; Bevir & Trentmann 2007; Béland & Gran 2008;
4 These monographs and edited collections are joined by an extensive body of
research reports and journal articles much too large to catalogue here – many such
contributions are cited in the following chapters of this volume. There is also
important research about privatisation and corporatisation of infrastructure and
utilities that we do not catalogue here, some of which is cited in Chapter 1.
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Dwivedi et al. 2013; Gingrich 2011; Meagher & Szebehely 2013; Mor-
gan & Campbell 2011; Newman & Clarke 2009). Finally, because, as we
have argued, marketisation is a complex process, the contributors have
examined different dimensions, from the political, organisational and
distributional to the historical, cultural and legal.
The first chapter, ‘The politics of market encroachment: policy-
maker rationales and voter responses to privatisation’ by Gabrielle
Meagher and Shaun Wilson, examines the policies and politics of mar-
ketisation in Australia, from the perspectives of policymakers and vot-
ers. The chapter begins by pointing out that while asset sales are highly
visible as ‘privatisation’, the marketisation of social services is much less
visible, but no less important, for understanding change in Australian
institutions. The authors survey market encroachment into Australian
society over the last 25 years, with the aim of understanding the pres-
sures on governments and the policy choices they have made in enact-
ing market reforms. One thing research has clearly established is that
asset sales have not been popular with the public, and were certainly
not demanded by them. The chapter presents recent data to show that
the sales of Telstra, Qantas and the Commonwealth Bank are the most
unpopular of the major economic reforms of the last three decades,
including the introduction of the GST and floating of the dollar. Mean-
while support for either public or non-profit provision of social services
remains overwhelming, which suggests a similar pattern of divergence
between the preferences of policy and business elites and the pref-
erences of the public when it comes to the involvement of for-profit
organisations.
The divergence between elite and public policy preferences on mar-
ket reform is partially reconciled at the ballot box through votes on
broader economic questions of taxation and redistribution. Australia’s
majoritarian electoral system, which tends to push the middle class to
the right,5 has left the Labor Party with a persistent challenge of rais-
5 Here we draw on Torben Iversen’s and David Soskice’s (2006) explanation of
the relationship between electoral institutions (majoritarian versus proportional
representation) and the extent of redistribution (lower versus higher, respectively).
They hypothesise that in majoritarian electoral systems (such as Australia’s)
‘[m]iddle-class voters will not like a right-wing government, but they have less to
fear from it [than from a left wing government], because if it lowers taxes and
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ing revenue for social purposes (Wilson 2013). One response to this
challenge has been for Labor to resort to market reform – a preferred
strategy by the conservative parties – as a means to build up service
provision. The result is a rough consensus on this direction, if not on
the distance to be travelled, among policymakers of both parties.
As governments have relied on market measures to grow social ser-
vice provision, they have profoundly changed the way they engage non-
profit organisations, and these organisations have themselves been pro-
foundly changed as a consequence. Thus, in a necessary complement
to the analysis of for-profit organisations that also threads through the
volume, Susan Goodwin and Ruth Phillips chart how marketisation
has also driven the growth of non-profit organisations (NPOs) in their
chapter, ‘The marketisation of human services and the expansion of the
not-for-profit sector’.
Goodwin and Phillips argue that marketisation has not just led to
the expansion of the ‘non-profit sector’ in social services, but has, in im-
portant ways, produced it from a disparate collection of large and small
charities and churches, and mostly small associations with roots in their
local community or in social movements. On the one hand, these or-
ganisations have been brought into a unified field by the technologies of
marketisation (such as competition, contracting out and performance
monitoring), in ways that have shaped a collective identity but have also
changed their internal operations. On the other hand, these organisa-
tions have been drawn more closely into the state itself, as they take
its money and implement its policies. The strange consequence – since
the state and civil society (within which non-profits are very often po-
sitioned) are the institutions most associated with democracy – is that
the public logic of democratic participation has been crowded out.
Finance in social markets
Proponents of market reform often argue that it will save money. To
many ears this is alluring, since in recent decades, despite growing na-
tional incomes (the Global Financial Crisis [GFC] notwithstanding),
spending below the preferred level, it also allows the middle classes to increase
private spending’ (2006, p. 170).
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debate about the affordability of social policies has been intense. As
Hujo and McClanahan (2009, pp. 1–2) put it, ‘the current approach
to financing social policy is dominated by a microperspective on how
to allocate a given amount of resources’. These ‘efficiency’ arguments
‘shift the burden of proof regarding the value of social policy to the ex-
penditures side, and at the same time, assume a glass ceiling for state
revenues’. The result is a policy frame that positions social policy sys-
tems as, following Paul Pierson,6 ‘trapped in conditions of “permanent
austerity” ’.
Despite the topicality of the ‘unaffordability’ of social policies,
Morel and Palme point out that how social provision is financed ‘re-
mains somewhat of a black box of the welfare state’, and that the hidden
nature of some financing mechanisms has ‘added to the confusion
about existing policy alternatives’ (2013, p. 401). But, as they continue,
these issues are of critical importance: the choice of instrument for fi-
nancing social provision has an impact not only on the redistributive
outcomes of social policy, but also on the political legitimacy of social
policy systems. Taking up these issues, contributors to the book exam-
ine three different types of financing mechanisms in Australian social
policy: a now entrenched mechanism of financing of retirement income
through occupational and fiscal welfare, a new mechanism of financing
the ‘social benefit bond’, and an old financing mechanism, the ‘state-
owned enterprise’.
In ‘The devil’s in the detail: The hidden costs of private retirement
incomes policy’, Adam Stebbing charts the institutionalisation of com-
pulsory occupational superannuation in Australia. Several key themes
of market reform are evident in the story of the expansion of super-
annuation, including extensive public subsidies for private provision,
the consolidation of a large and powerful for-profit sector, the individ-
ualisation of risks and benefits, and important partisan differences in
instrument design, despite an apparently bipartisan overall direction.
Since the early 1990s, policy has shifted from commitment to col-
lective responsibility for income support in old age in the form of the
age pension, to encouraging individuals to ‘save’ for their retirement,
primarily through superannuation. Governments rationalised manda-
6 Hujo and McClanahan cite Paul Pierson’s formulation from his The new politics
of the welfare state (2001).
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tory superannuation as required by the costs of population ageing and
the need to increase national savings. Stebbing unpacks this simplistic
understanding of what compulsory occupational superannuation is,
how it works and who benefits most from it. First, unlike the age pen-
sion, accessed as social welfare by older citizens who meet the means
test, superannuation in Australia is a form of occupational welfare, the
benefits of which accrue to individuals on the basis of their employ-
ment, paid for by their employer (and perhaps by themselves). A sec-
ond, and less visible, aspect of superannuation is that it is also arranged
as a form of fiscal welfare: that is, through generous tax concessions, so-
cial provision is made for beneficiaries via the taxation system. When
the occupational and fiscal welfare elements of superannuation are
taken into account, the inequitable consequences of privatising retire-
ment incomes become very stark. People on low incomes – the majority
of whom are women who work part-time, often for decades and of-
ten in low-paid jobs – face living on a residual universal payment in
their old age. Meanwhile, those with the highest incomes – those in
lifetime, full-time, well-paid employment, and so mostly men – receive
the highest benefits, not just from their occupational superannuation,
but also from regressive tax expenditures, which amounted to $30.2 bil-
lion in revenue forgone from the public purse in 2011–12. To put this
figure into perspective, it is almost two-thirds as much as total Com-
monwealth expenditure on support for older people, including both the
age pension and aged care services.7 Stebbing argues that superannua-
tion tax reform is required to address these anomalies.
As Stebbing notes, one of the processes driving reform of retire-
ment incomes around the world is ‘financialisation’, through which
financial calculation and financial institutions increasingly dominate
the economy and the social world. Individual superannuation accounts
and superannuation choice are just a couple of ways that every person
who takes a job in Australia is exposed to financial risks and obliged to
engage in their calculation (Bryan 2010). In ‘Social benefit bonds: Fi-
nancial markets inside the state’, Dick Bryan and Angela Mitropoulos
7 According to the 2012–13 Budget, the Commonwealth spent $48.7 billion on
assistance to the aged in the fiscal year 2011–12 (Treasury 2012, table 9.1). Figures
(and their source) on tax expenditures on superannuation and other social
purposes are reported in Meagher and Wilson, this volume.
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explore how financialisation is changing how policymakers think about
funding social services, and opening even more opportunities for
profit-making from social activities.
Bryan and Mitropoulos introduce a very recent innovation in Aus-
tralian social policy: a financing mechanism called the social benefit
bond (SBB). These instruments bring the logic – and resources – of
the (financial) market into social provision, by enabling private sector
actors to finance public service provision, on the basis that their ‘in-
vestments’ will result in a private financial return. In what the authors
say are ‘essentially social experiments’, the role of the state in providing
for social needs is dramatically re-cast. Under the pervasive account
of social welfare as ‘unaffordable’, the welfare state is represented as
unable to find or to raise enough funds to meet social needs – even
those as serious or important as prisoner rehabilitation or alternative
care for abused and neglected children, the service areas in which
SBBs have been developed. In this context, a discourse of ‘alternative
financing mechanisms’ has arisen to support a shift away from the con-
ventional tax-spend funding in social policy. These alternatives have
been pounced upon by non-profit (non-state) social service organi-
sations, which were drawn into provision of publicly financed social
services partly as a cost-saving measure and are themselves caught
in the ‘unaffordability’ frame.8 Indeed, it is highly unlikely that SBBs
would have emerged if activities such as foster care had remained in the
public sector. Through instruments such as SBBs, collective endeavours
within a public logic, through which social needs were met from con-
tributions from the community as a whole via taxation, are re-cast as
private opportunities for businesses to make money out of (solving) so-
cial problems, with a veneer of philanthropy.
For all their novelty, SBBs are not the first or only way that the state
and the financial markets have been institutionally entwined. Leanne
8 A colourful but anecdotal example illustrates this point. The marketing pitch
for a conference called ‘Social finance: progressing impact investing in Australia’,
put together by a for-profit conference organising company in mid-March 2014
was: ‘Are you a Not-for-Profit organisation struggling for funding? Unfortunately,
for most Not-for-Profits, the answer to that question is a resounding “yes”. The
simple fact is, there isn’t enough money coming from government (or corporate or
philanthropic organisations) to tackle the social challenges we face. The good news
is there is a way to access more funding. It’s called Social Finance’.
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Cutcher and Johann Loibl’s chapter, ‘ “Which bank?” Competition and
community service obligations in the retail banking sector’, draws at-
tention to the role the state has long had as a market player. Their
narrative of the privatisation of banking in Australia also tells of the loss
of a collective logic in the wake of financialisation, and but also of the
possibilities and fragilities of structural overlap in institutional orders.
Australia has a strong tradition of state-owned enterprises, and in
banking they have had a range of purposes. In the colonies of 19th-cen-
tury Australia, state-owned banks were a bulwark against the perceived
avarice and incompetence of private banks and early after Federation,
the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) was established with a
similar rationale. Cutcher and Loibl show the social effects of publicly
owned financial institutions, which are distinctive because they are im-
pelled (by virtue of being public) to operate under two institutional
logics: the market logic of competition and the community logic of en-
suring equitable access to financial services. The privatisation of the
CBA – also justified as increasing competition – resulted in a loss of
community logic in banking, under which the CBA served the whole
community, rather than individual persons or individual companies.
The now private Commonwealth Bank is today part of a highly con-
centrated banking sector, dominated by four large private banks. Swept
along by the process of financialisation, consumers face a bewildering
array of financial ‘products’, offered by fewer organisations, from which
they are expected to choose with risk-calculating foresight. However, a
set of small financial institutions that continue to balance community
and market logics persists, in the form of non-profit financial ‘mu-
tuals’. Cutcher and Loibl conclude by pointing out that these hybrid
organisations are unlikely, alone, to be able to redress the trouble with
Australian banking today; the Big Four also need to change their ways
of doing business.
The changing mix in the mixed economy
As noted above, both for-profit and NPOs are engaged in providing
publicly funded social services in Australia, in a complex mixed econ-
omy, and in most service fields, for-profit providers are increasing their
share. Table 1 presents available data about the organisational com-
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position of provision in residential aged care, child care, employment
services and school education, showing change over time. The clearest
trend is the decline of the public sector.
Table 1: Organisations in Australian social services, 1980–2014. For sources and
notes, see appendix at the end of the chapter
Residential aged care (operational places, 30 June, %)
1994 2000 2005 2010 2013 % change
1994–2013
Public 12 10 8 6 6 –6
Non-profit 61 63 61 59 58 –3
For-profit 28 27 31 35 36 +8
n= 131,418 141,237 158,901 179,749 186,278 +54,860
Long day care for children (approved/licensed providers, %)
1994 2000 2004–05 2008–09 2012–13† % change
1994–2013
Public 16 10 3 3 6 –10
Non-profit 26 24 26 22 31 +5
For-profit 58 67 71 75 63 +5
n= 3,015 4,012 n. a. n. a. 6,409 +3,394
Employment services (provider organisations, %)
1995* 1998** 2003 2009 2014 % change
1994–2013
Public 80 37 3 0 0 ≥–80
Non-profit 20 30 47 61 68 ~+50
For-profit 33 50 39 33 ~+25
Schools (full-time students, %)
1980 1990 2000 2013 2013 % change
1980–2013
Public 78 72 69 66 65 –13
Private 22 28 31 34 35 +13
n= 2,984,562 3,041,657 3,247,425 3,486,879 3,633,438 +648,876
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Another clear trend is not visible in this data: the growth of private
corporate entities in service provision. One stark example is the profile
of providers in Job Services Australia (JSA), through which publicly
funded job placement services are provided to people who are un-
employed. The three largest for-profit providers will receive a total of
more than $1.5 billion, which amounts to 21 percent of the total value
of all JSA contracts, for the current contract period of July 2009 to
June 2015.9 Of the three largest for-profit providers, two are inter-
national companies. One of the international companies, MAXNet-
Work Pty Ltd, received the largest contract of more than $750 million.
MAXNetWork is a subsidiary of Maximus, a company listed on the
New York Stock Exchange with market capitalisation of US$3.9 billion
in March 2015. As its primary business model, Maximus targets public
programs in health and human services in the United States and several
other countries, now including Australia. Since 2006, MAXNetWork
has been awarded contracts to the total value of $812 million in tenders
by the Australian Goverment. The second largest for-profit provider of
employment services, with JSA contracts worth $362 million, consists
of three subsidiaries of Employment Services Holdings Pty Ltd (ESH).
ESH has operations in the United Kingdom as well as Australia. The
three subsidiaries operating in Australia have or have had contracts to
the value of a further $59 million to provide general personnel, Indige-
nous job training and placement and humanitarian settlement services
between 2007 and 2015. The three largest non-profits are the Salvation
Army, Campbell Page and Mission Australia, and together they have
JSA contracts amounting to 17 percent of the total value for the con-
tract period. (Brief accounts of the establishment of the Job Network,
the predecessor to JSA, and of the rise and fall of ABC Learning, a cor-
porate child care provider, are discussed in Chapter 1 of this volume.
Chapter 7 discusses the development of corporate health care.)
There are a range of theoretical approaches to the shift of respon-
sibility for defining, providing, financing and controlling of social ser-
vices from the state to private organisations. First, there are theoretical
9 Data about contract values for these and other services is publicly available
data on AusTender, the web portal for the Australian government’s tender system.
The figures quoted here are based on the authors’ calculations of contract data
taken from AusTender.
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arguments for public involvement in social services as a remedy for
market failure, and which emphasise the public logic of universality,
democracy and citizenship organised through bureaucracies. Second,
there are theoretical arguments for private involvement in social ser-
vices. Those which advocate for-profit involvement emphasise the logic
of the market through competition, innovation, efficiency and choice,
while those advocating non-profit involvement emphasise a commu-
nity or associational logic through participation, responsiveness and
reciprocity. Third, there are arguments for a revised role of government
in the provision of public services, characterised in the catch-phrase
of NPM, as ‘steering not rowing’, such that political decision-making is
separated from the management of public services, and public–private
‘partnerships’ are a substitute for public services. Several contributions
to the book explore the extent to which the second and third have in-
formed change in Australian public administration in recent decades,
resulting in a changing mix in the mixed economy.
In ‘Community aged care providers in a competitive environment:
Past, present and future’, Bob Davidson examines the structure and
evolution of an area of Australian social policy that has, by and large,
conventionally been ‘outsourced’ by government. Indeed, community
aged care is a clear example of the dominant ‘Australian way’ of social
service provision: since the 1970s, the state has sponsored private or-
ganisations in several major domains, including aged care, but also
neighbourhood and family support services, women’s services, crisis
housing services and legal services (Goodwin 2003). Community aged
care, then, is a clear example of the state ‘not rowing’, and Davidson uses
industrial organisation theory and historical analysis to show that state
steering has shaped the mix of types of boats and types of rowers (to
stretch the metaphor) in making the ‘quasi-market’ for these services.
In community aged care, the share of for-profit provision is rela-
tively low, unlike residential aged care or child care, in which for-profit
providers have considerable shares, and listed corporations are impor-
tant players within the for-profit sector. Davidson explains why this is
so, and how recent policy developments might change the profile of
providers in the future. The legacy of a strong, pre-existing non-profit
sector and a careful use of selected market instruments have meant
that, to date, the operation of the community care quasi-market has
worked to select social maximisers, rather than profit maximisers. Thus,
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service quality has generally been good – for those who have received
services, at any rate; the rate of unmet need is high. However, as ‘con-
sumerist’ service models gain increasing currency in policy discourse,
major changes to the instruments through which the community care
quasi-market is organised are under discussion. Davidson argues that
although service users would apparently have more choice under con-
sumerist models, a ‘freer’ market in community care would also endan-
ger the stability, equity, efficiency and service quality delivered by the
current arrangements.
Australian governments have been playing an increasing role in so-
cial service areas such as community aged care, child care and others,
even if they do so by making and coordinating markets for those activ-
ities. In housing, however, private markets have always been dominant
and have become increasingly so in recent decades, as Lucy Groenhart
and Nicole Gurran explain in ‘Home security: Marketisation and the
changing face of housing assistance in Australia’. Since colonisation, a
property development industry has existed and most Australians have
provided for their housing through private transactions with commer-
cial providers. However, governments have intervened outside these
private arrangements with housing assistance measures aimed at meet-
ing the needs of citizens for whom the private housing market is unaf-
fordable. Groenhart and Gurran document the changing rationales and
instruments of government housing assistance, and show how these are
connected to the dissemination of NPM in housing policy internation-
ally.
The best known form of housing assistance is direct provision of
housing itself, through government construction, ownership and sub-
sidisation of the costs of (public) housing. But this is now a vestigial and
residual offering – the number of public housing dwellings has fallen
in recent decades, and access to them has been increasingly targeted on
the most disadvantaged members of the community. Meanwhile, ex-
penditure on vouchers to assist other low-income households pay rent
in the private market has grown considerably, and a range of other mea-
sures have sought to bring more private resources and private actors
into housing assistance. Increasing choice for residents in what is now
called ‘social housing’ has been one goal of marketising reform in the
sector, but without a substantial increase in the quantity of social hous-
ing, it is not clear whether this goal can genuinely be realised.
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A similar trend is evident in the Australian health care system,
although the public sector has historically had a much larger role in
health than in housing. In ‘Money and markets in Australia’s health care
system’, Fran Collyer, Kirsten Harley and Stephanie Short put health
care marketisation in the context of the history of the Australian health
care system. They argue that this system has been dramatically trans-
formed in recent decades, such that decisions about health care provi-
sion are based increasingly on market rather than medical considera-
tions. This is perhaps the community’s greatest concern about marketi-
sation – that concern for the public good will be replaced by self-in-
terest, especially profit maximisation. The authors portray a shift from
a sector dominated by public and not-for-profit institutions to a sector
in which private corporations now play a considerable role, especially
private hospitals and private health insurers. They argue that the emer-
gence of ‘corporate health care’ in a ‘highly protected market system’
has been enabled by successive governments. The shift matters for a
number of reasons, they contend. Government subsidies for private
health care and health insurance markets are a drag on the health care
budget. Commercial interests in the system distort health care planning
and service delivery – services are placed where they will garner the
best return for shareholders, not where they are most needed. The over-
arching consequence, they argue, is that Australian people are no longer
assured access to a universal health care system in which a uniformly
high standard of timely health care is available to all.
Questions about if and how marketisation works are at the centre
of Anna Boucher’s contribution, ‘Marketisation of immigrant skills as-
sessment in Australia’. Boucher provides a forensic view of the out-
sourcing state, through her analysis of marketised immigration skills
assessment. This area of social policy is particularly significant in Aus-
tralia, where immigration policy has become increasingly oriented to-
wards labour market goals. Before 1999, officers of the Department
of Immigration assessed the skills of immigration applicants: in other
words, public servants made decisions that could be appealed under
public law. Since 1999, these assessments have been carried out by a
range of independent assessing bodies, some private professional asso-
ciations, others commercial arms of government agencies. In her focus
on a single, relatively bounded area of provision, Boucher is able to de-
velop a framework for assessing the extent to which marketisation can
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be justified in this arena, but her approach has wider application and
her findings wider implications.
The effects of marketisation of skills assessment, Boucher argues,
have been mixed. Timeliness and accuracy have increased, but other
problems have arisen. Marketisation has involved significant cost-shift-
ing to immigration applicants, who must be able to afford to pay for
skills assessment in order to be even considered. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, rights to review of assessments have been truncated, because the
position of private providers under public law is unclear. The tight focus
of this chapter establishes a general question for other subcontracted
and commodified areas of social provision: when services are no longer
provided as public services, what mechanisms are available to assure
service users’ administrative rights?
Markets, consumers and ‘choice’
Market logic, with its central concepts of competition and choice, is
both a powerful ‘cognitive lock’ (Blyth 2001) and very highly valorised
in public policy discourse. Policy goals such as enhancing efficiency or
choice seem self-evidently positive and to reject them is not politically
feasible, nor perhaps even desirable. Indeed, the concept of choice has
functioned as a bridge between elite policy preferences and those of the
public.
Choice has clearly become a very powerful concept in policy dis-
course. In almost all areas of Australian social policy increasing choice
for people using services has become an important justification for
marketisation. This is partly because the alternative to choice is framed
as someone else deciding on one’s behalf. This is politically and psycho-
logically unattractive, even though social service systems necessarily
continue to rely to some extent on elements of prescription and even
compulsion, whether exercised through professional expertise, statu-
tory authority or market dynamics. But it is also because choice is a
protean concept. While it is a keyword of neoclassical economic theory,
which formalises the logic of the market, ‘choice’ has a place in other
policy frames or discourses, each of which motivates, justifies and mo-
bilises it differently. Accordingly, the meaning of choice itself changes,
depending on the frame/discourse in which it is used.
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Within the market frame, choice as a policy idea has been propa-
gated by an elite epistemic community, drawing on public choice the-
ory, neoclassical economics and NPM. The concept of the individual
in this frame is atomistic: an agent with wants who maximises utility
through exchanges; and choice is abstract and instrumental. At the in-
dividual level, choice is a means to meeting wants; at a system level, ag-
gregated individual choices are a means for reaching an efficient distri-
bution of resources that meet those consumer wants. There is not much
concern within this frame for the contents of choices. The perspec-
tive is system-wide: the sum of individual choices drives competition in
markets, leading to increased efficiency and quality. The suite of pol-
icy prescriptions is familiar: outsourcing, vouchers, personal budgets,
introduction of new providers who compete to provide services, includ-
ing promotion of private sector and specifically for-profit providers. Be-
cause this frame has a rather empty concept of choice, it does not neces-
sarily align with policies seeking to give people choices over things that
mean something to them. In practice, choice of provider has been the
typical offering, on the assumption that individuals will find a provider
that suits them from the more diverse array that market reforms are as-
sumed to present to them.
But choice has also been a central concept in what we might call
a human rights frame in social services policy. This frame has ‘bottom
up’ origins, in the women’s and disability rights movements. Its concept
of the individual is a person with rights to autonomy and participation
in their personal, social and political worlds, and choice is one means
through which each person can enact self-determination. The perspec-
tive within this frame is person-centred: choice is a means of expressing
and maintaining identity, dignity and autonomy. Self-determination or
control over one’s own life is the goal, and choice enables this. Typi-
cal policy prescriptions include removing barriers to participation and
provision of necessary support in ways that enable choice and control
over that support, including through user-led organisations. As a frame
that has most purchase within the disability field, personal budgets con-
trolled by the individual requiring assistance are also a typical policy
proposal – one shared with the market frame. Because the perspective
within this frame is person-centred, making choice meaningful for peo-
ple is an important policy goal – people should have a choice over the
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dimensions of service design and execution that mean something to
them and that enhance their dignity and control over their lives.
What these frames share is that choice is a good in itself, and this
gives some insight into the irresistibility of policies rationalised as in-
creasing choice. However, these frames construct who people are (that
is, they constitute subjects) and the circumstances and contents of their
choices in quite different ways. The policy prescriptions of these two
frames overlap only partially. Meanwhile, in general, the market frame
has prevailed in the design of social service reform.
The impact of marketisation in education policy, specifically on
parents choosing a school for their children, is explored by Helen Proc-
tor and Claire Aitchison in ‘Markets in education: “School choice” and
family capital’. They point out that school choice has, ironically, itself
become compulsory, and that old patterns of inequality are reproduced
in new ways through it. Parents’ wealth and knowhow have always
been important, even decisive, in the educational fortunes of their chil-
dren, but this dynamic is exacerbated under current arrangements,
which are producing and affirming a particular kind of entrepreneurial,
hyper-involved parent. In other words, school choice policies produce
students, families and teachers as particular types of subjects. In the
school choice case studies they explore, the authors find that school
choice favours particular kinds of children, families and educational
forms and that the exercise of school choice is highly constrained. They
also find that the process of school choice is labour intensive and emo-
tionally and intellectually challenging. For many parents, the outcome
was tinged with dissatisfaction as they recognised and experienced the
limitations of choice in practice.
Marketisation is changing social services, but it is not the only
trend reshaping social policy in Australia. In the final chapter, ‘Con-
ditional income transfers and choice in social services: Just more con-
ditions and more markets?’, Terry Carney contrasts marketisation in
residential aged care services with increasing conditionality in income
support (social security) payments for people of working age. While
most welfare services are being re-arranged in ways that ostensibly ex-
pand consumer choice, in income support, precisely the reverse is hap-
pening. Certain groups of people have become subject to authoritarian
and involuntary ‘management’ of their social security payments, which
removes personal control over half or more of their income, and with-
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draws benefits if they do not comply with detailed behavioural manage-
ment requirements. The groups subjected to income management are
among the most socially excluded and disadvantaged Australians, no-
tably (but not exclusively) Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory.
Yet despite the apparently wide discrepancy between income man-
agement and marketisation, the two policy approaches share a common
and deep root in individualising the subjects of the welfare state. Carney
points out that the design of conditional income support programs as-
sumes that the causes of social disadvantage are individual, and that the
people involved have or retain sufficient agency to (choose to) act in
response to the measures’ incentives. In this way, the structural causes
of disadvantage are obscured, just as the market frame obscures the
structural inequalities of distribution that arise in choice-based service
systems.
Examining these apparently divergent policy approaches side-by-
side makes it less possible to see marketisation in Australian social
service systems as a genuine attempt to improve citizens’ lives through
the provision of greater ‘choice’. Carney considers several explanations
for these developments. The most striking, from our perspective, is that
contemporary social policy is an ‘exercise in the construction of citi-
zens capable of exercising “regulated freedom” ’, that is, the welfare state
must ‘responsibilise’ citizens, and only responsibilised citizens are de-
serving of choice.
Was there no other way?
Australian social services are arranged through a complex mix of or-
ganisations, institutional logics, and policy instruments. In some sec-
tors, the mix is more complex than others and the direction of change
more difficult to discern. However, to a lesser or greater extent, market
instruments and actors have come to play a larger role across all fields
of social services. Yet marketisation was not the only possible direction
for reform to address perceived problems with the public sector and for
developing the social service system. In Australia and elsewhere, poli-
cies, strategies and actors working within the community logic of the
associational sphere have emerged and contended with the logic of the
market to (re)shape social policy.
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In the 1970s, the Whitlam Labor government (1972–75) sought to
expand new organisational bases for social service provision, framed
within a community logic. The policy vehicles for these developments
included the Australian Assistance Plan and its associated Regional
Councils for Social Development (RCSD) and the Community Health
Program. The Australian Assistance Plan (AAP), for example, was part
of a radical reconceptualisation of decision-making about the allo-
cation of social welfare resources in line with new social movement
objectives of self-determination and the creation of more participatory,
inclusive and responsive social policy. A variety of grants were dis-
persed to volunteer RSCDs who worked with community development
workers and social planners funded by the AAP to mobilise ‘grass roots’
action around welfare and to encourage the formation of local asso-
ciations to deliver welfare services to the whole community (Byrne &
Davis 1998; Oppenheimer 2008).
The AAP, like other Whitlam experiments, was short-lived – one
of the first actions of the incoming Fraser government in 1976 was
to withdraw support from it. But it had a lasting legacy: historians
and social policy analysts have argued that the AAP and related de-
velopments underpinned the formation of a ‘community sector’ of lo-
cally organised, often government-funded, community groups in Aus-
tralia (Broom 1991; Eisenstein 1996; Melville 1993). This ‘state-spon-
sored community sector’ (Goodwin 2003, p. 15; see also Goodwin &
Phillips, this volume) was less an attempt to develop an alternative be-
tween the bureaucratised state and the competitive market (for which
see, for example, Botsman & Latham 2001); but rather an alternative to
the bureaucratised state and the paternalism of the charity sector.
The AAP did not succeed in generating a participatory revolution
in Australian social policy. One reason was, of course, as Melanie Op-
penheimer (2008) points out, the Labor defeat in 1975. But Oppen-
heimer canvasses several other reasons, some related to professional
and organisational rivalries, some to the AAP’s weakly developed base
in the federal bureaucracy and others to institutional and political bar-
riers of Australian federalism (2008, pp. 177–81; see also Graycar 1977).
These proximal causes are no doubt important, but so too is the emer-
gence and consolidation of market ideas and practices in social policy.
With the rise of NPM and the increasing marketisation of social policy
since the 1990s, the ‘expectations for social relations and human and
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organizational behavior’ (Thornton & Ocasio 2008, p. 104) that take
shape within a community logic have diminished. The ‘community sec-
tor’ has become increasingly incorporated into the marketised state,
dominated by large charities now steered as much by market and cor-
porate logics as by associational ones (see Goodwin & Phillips, this
volume).
But at least as important as the decline of the community logic in
the non-profit sector is the declining effect of a public logic in social
policy. Shortly after the end of the AAP, Adam Graycar (1977, p. 20)
wrote that the only avenue for major change in Australian social policy
is through forms of community participation and citizen control. The
major impediments here are the difficulty in establishing a participa-
tory culture, the limited scope of the objectives of citizen participation,
difficulties in establishing legitimacy for citizen groups, and difficul-
ties in gaining access to sufficient resources to make the participatory
process a politically powerful process.
It is difficult to imagine that policies promoting consumer choice
will contribute to fostering the participatory culture – the deeper
democracy – required. It is not least for this reason that marketisation
is a disturbing trend for those concerned about inequality and democ-
racy, and about rights and power in Australian social policy.
Appendix
Sources and notes to Table 1.
• Residential aged care: Australia’s welfare 1995 for 1994; Report on
government services for 2000, 2005, Reports on operation of the
Aged Care Act, 1997 for 2010 and 2013.
• Long day care for children: Australia’s welfare 1995, authors calcu-
lations based on table 4. 2 for 1994; State of child care in Australia
April 2010, published by the Office of Early Childhood Education
and Care, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace
Relations, for 2004–05 and 2008–09; Report on government services
for 2012–13, authors’ calculation, note that data for South Australia
are from 2011–12.
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• Employment services (Job Network/ Job Services Australia): Senate
Employment, Education and Training Legislation Committee,
Hansard, 23 November 1995, for 1995, Riggs (2001, p. 378) for 1998,
Eardley (2003, p. 7) for 2003, personal communication, Director,
Director Deed Administration, Business Partnerships Branch, Em-
ployment Services and Support Group, Department of Employment,
March 2014, for 2009 and 2014. * Contracted case management ser-
vices only, delivered under the ALP’s Working Nation program. **
Figures for 1998 and 2003 are the results of the tendering processes
that ran for 2–3 years after those dates.
• Schools: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Schools Australia, various
years. Note, the vast majority of private schools are formally non-
profit.
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